Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q͉p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p¬q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements.
How do people understand sentences with if ? Although the interpretation of conditional statements in everyday language is highly dependent on content and context, most theorists agree that there is a core meaning associated with the surface form "if . . . then" (see, e.g., Braine & O'Brien, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) . This enables people to comprehend and reason from if-then statements out of context and with arbitrary contents as these statements are often used in psychological experiments on conditional reasoning. More important, this core meaning enables them to understand conditional statements in everyday life even when content and context are of little help; for example, descriptions of technical devices ("If the switch is up, the machine starts") or seemingly arbitrary observed regularities ("If the litmus paper turns red, the substance is acid"). The main purpose of our article is to elucidate the psychological core meaning of descriptive conditional statements, that is, the modal interpretation that adults without training in formal logic give to if-then statements about states of affair in the world when neither content nor context suggests a particular reading.
The psychological meaning of conditionals must be distinguished from their logical meaning. Whereas the former refers to how people in fact represent the meaning of conditional statements, the latter refers to their normative interpretation according to a formal system like propositional calculus. The logical meaning of conditionals is usually defined as the material implication. The material implication is defined by a truth table (see Table 1 ), according to which "if p then q" is false if and only if p is true and q is false.
One problem with the interpretation of the conditional as material implication is that it leads to counterintuitive conclusions. A material implication is true when its antecedent is false. Thus, from an antecedent p that one knows to be false one can conclude any arbitrary conditional statement "if p then q." For example, "If I had two pennies more than I have, I could buy a Lamborghini" would be logically true, because the antecedent is granted to be false by design. One could also derive conditionals with mutually exclusive consequents; for example, "If there is life on the moon then Anne is in Paris" and "If there is life on the moon then Anne is in Moscow" are both true at the same time simply because there is no life on the moon. People not trained in formal logic are not likely to accept such statements as true, however. Thus, one can expect that the psychological meaning of conditionals does not match the material implication.
The evidence suggests that in fact it does not. Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) , for example, asked participants to sort pictures representing the four cases of a conditional's truth table into three categories, according to whether the conditional is true, false, or irrelevant given the state of affairs on the picture. The majority of participants judged the case pq as true, p¬q as false, and the cases ¬pq and ¬p¬q as irrelevant (where ¬ ϭ not). This pattern corresponds to what Wason (1966) called a "defective truth table" (see Table 1 ). Similar results were found when people were asked to produce, on their own, cases that either verify a conditional, or cases that falsify it, respectively. Participants mainly generated pq cases for verification and p¬q cases for falsification; cases with false antecedents were rarely produced (Evans, 1972) .
The idea of a truth table is incorporated in the mental model theory of conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992) . "If p then q" is represented as a set of models, one for each truth table case that makes the statement true:
Usually people will represent only the first model, pq, explicitly, and will represent the other two models in an implicit, elliptic way:
[p]q . . .
In this notation, the ellipsis points stand for implicit models that are not further specified, except that the square brackets around p signify that no other model includes a case of p. The distinction of explicit and implicit models mirrors the idea of a defective truth table. Ideally, reasoners will flesh out (i.e., make explicit) implicit models when needed, but in reality this often fails because of limitations of working memory (Johnson-Laird et al., 1992) .
The interpretation of the conditional as material implication, and its interpretation in terms of truth tables in general, has long been disputed in philosophy (e.g., Adams, 1991; Lewis, 1976 ; for a brief review, see Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003) . Building on this tradition, Edgington (1991 Edgington ( , 1995 argued that there is no truth table account of conditionals that captures the meaning of if-then in natural language. People use conditionals not only in contexts in which they are perfectly sure about truth or falsity, she argued, but mostly in contexts in which a certain degree of belief in a statement is warranted. The reasonable degree of belief in a statement can be formalized as its probability. Following previous accounts (e.g., Adams, 1991; Ramsey, 1931) , Edgington proposed to express the degree of belief in "if p then q" as the conditional probability of q given p. She demonstrated that there is no combination of entries in a truth table such that its probability matches P(q͉p) over the full range of the probability scale. This leads to the conclusion that a conditional statement is not truth functional, that is, it does not express a proposition about what is the case. More recent theories in psychology (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) also regard conditionals as expressing conditional probabilities. Two experiments by Hadjichristidis et al. (2001) showed that people's estimated probabilities of conditionals of the form "if p then q" match their estimates of the corresponding conditional probabilities P(q͉p) very closely.
In the series of experiments reported here we used a probabilistic version of the truth table evaluation task of Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) , thereby beginning to fulfill the requirement voiced by Edgington (1995) to investigate the relationship between the degrees of belief in elementary statements ( p, q) and in conditionals ("if p then q") over the full probability range. Participants were informed about the frequencies of the four truth table cases in a population of fixed size and asked to rate the truth or the probability of a conditional. Frequencies were used because they seem to be more natural to convey probabilistic information than probabilities or percentages (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) .
A probabilistic account would obviously predict that the estimated probability of "if p then q," as well as the willingness to accept this statement as true, will vary with P(q͉p), which equals P( pq) divided by the sum of P( pq) and P( p¬q). Thus, we hypothesized that participants' ratings of the conditional should depend on the ratio of the probabilities for the first two cases in the truth table, regardless of their absolute value or their value relative to the other two cases.
What would the mental model theory predict? Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni (1999) extended the model theory to probabilities. The basic principle is that the probability of a statement equals the proportion of models for which the statement is true, weighted by the probabilities of the models. By default, each model is assigned an equal probability and therefore receives unit weight. In our experiments, the frequency information should lead to different probabilities for individual models. Therefore, the probability estimate for a statement S should equal the sum of the frequencies associated with those models that make S true, divided by the sum of the frequencies of all possible cases (i.e., the size of the population). A conditional statement is usually represented by two models, one explicit, representing the case pq, and one implicit. The frequency associated with the implicit model can be estimated only if this model is fleshed out so that one can see which case(s) it represents. Therefore, there are two options to estimate the probability of a conditional. One could take the frequency of the one explicit model ( pq) and divide it by the size of the population, thereby estimating the proportion of cases that make the explicit model true. This effectively ignores the implicit models-a failure that, according to mental model theory, is quite common and can be attributed to factors such as lack of working memory capacity (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) . Alternatively, one could flesh out the implicit model, thereby generating the full set of three models for the conditional. In the latter case, the probability of the conditional would equal the sum of the proportions associated with the three cases of the truth table that make the material implication true (see Table 1 ), which equals 1 Ϫ P( p¬q).
To test these predictions, we realized a 2 ϫ 2 design by varying the frequency of pq and the ratio of pq to p¬q (see Table 2 ). The probabilistic theory predicts that the ratings (of probability or truth) for the conditional should covary positively with the ratio of pq to p¬q (we refer to this as ratio). The mental model theory without elaboration of the implicit model (MM1) predicts that the ratings should covary positively with the frequency of pq. The mental model theory with elaboration (MM2) predicts that the ratings should covary negatively with the frequency of p¬q. Table 2 shows that the latter frequency can be broken down into two main effects of the two design variables: MM2 therefore predicts that ratings for the conditional increase with the ratio but decrease with the frequency of pq. Because the fully elaborated mental models correspond to the truth table of the material implication, the same prediction results from the hypothesis that people understand the conditional in agreement with propositional logic, that is, as material implication.
In a recent series of experiments conducted independently of our work, Evans et al. (2003) found support for the interpretation of conditionals as conditional probabilities as well as for the interpretation based on MM1, which they called conjunctive interpretation. Evans et al. (2003) varied the frequency of pq cases and the frequency of p¬q cases orthogonally, thereby manipulating indirectly the conditional probability P(q͉p). Participants received frequency information about a deck of cards and were asked to rate the probability that a conditional statement "if p then q" was true for one card selected at random from the deck. Both P(q͉p) and the frequency of pq were strongly correlated across problems with participants' mean ratings of the probability of the conditional. Contrary to what would be expected from an interpretation of the conditional as material implication (as in MM2), increasing the frequency of ¬p cases decreased the estimated likelihood of the conditional.
In addition, in their Experiment 3 Evans et al. (2003) conducted regression analyses on data from individual participants, predicting the estimated likelihood of the conditional from P(q͉p) and the frequency of pq over 36 problems. They were able to classify most participants into two groups of about equal size, one in which P(q͉p) but not the frequency of pq had a significant beta weight, and one in which only the frequency of pq had a significant beta weight.
One limitation of the design used by Evans et al. (2003) is that they did not vary the conditional probability P(q͉p) and the frequency of pq orthogonally. The high correlations of both factors with the probability estimates for the conditional clearly demonstrate that both have an effect, but it is difficult to estimate their relative contribution independently because of their collinearity. Here we report five experiments with the orthogonal design outlined above. To anticipate, our results fully corroborated the conclusions of Evans et al. (2003) . In addition, we provide evidence for the generalizability of these findings. In Experiments 1A and 1B we investigated the effect of the frequency manipulation on the probability rating for a conditional with abstract material. In Experiment 2 we asked participants to rate the conditional as true or false. This is a crucial test for the hypothesis that participants generally interpret conditionals as conditional probabilities, not just when asked to rate the probability that conditionals are true. To our knowledge, this test has not been done before. In Experiments 3 and 4, we investigated conditionals with more realistic contents, in particular the effect of pragmatic utilities on ratings of the probability and the truth of conditionals. Moreover, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that the pattern of results observed for conditionals extends to logically equivalent statements using the quantifier all.
Experiments 1A and 1B
Method
Experiment 1A was a paper-pencil experiment using a within-subject design; Experiment 1B was a parallel experiment conducted through the Internet with a between-subjects design.
Participants. Participants of Experiment 1A were 61 high school students from Potsdam (ages 17-21 years) who did the task in the context of a larger study on other issues. In Experiment 1B, responses from 2,255 people were initially accepted. This required that respondents identified themselves by an e-mail address (to which feedback could be sent) that was not identical with one previously used, to reduce the likelihood of multiple participation of the same person. Of the 2,255 data sets, we discarded those with missing values on one of the experimental variables and those containing illegal probability values on one or more questions. The number of remaining participants for each group (with the number of discarded participants in parentheses) was as follows: HH, 539 (49); HL, 520 (40); LH, 468 (113); and LL, 475 (51) , where HH ϭ high frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); HL ϭ high frequency of pq, low P(q͉p); LH ϭ low frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); and LL ϭ low frequency of pq, low P(q͉p). Their age means of the four groups ranged from 24.3 to 26.5 years (SD ϭ 7.4 -8.4, total range ϭ 12-63); the group means of years of formal education ranged from 13.8 and 14.4 (SD ϭ 3.6 -4.2). There were 1,260 men and 638 women (the remainder did not respond to this question).
Materials and procedure. For Experiment 1A we prepared booklets with five pages, one with a general introduction and one for each condition. The general introduction previewed the task; it explained that probability estimations should be given on a scale from 0 (totally impossible) to 100 (absolutely certain) and that no calculations were required.
In each condition participants were first asked to imagine a deck of 2,000 cards, each card having printed on it an A or a B in either red or blue. They were then informed about the frequencies of the four possible combinations of a letter with a color (see Table 2 ). A first set of questions asked for the probability that a single card, selected at random from the deck, corresponds to a particular combination of a letter with a color. These questions served as a manipulation check for the probability variation. We introduced a second pair of questions by stating that one card was drawn at random from the deck, and it turned out to have an A. Participants were then asked to estimate the probability that this letter is red, and the probability that it is blue. Thus, these questions asked directly for estimates of conditional probabilities P(q͉p) and P(¬q͉p).
Next, participants were informed that a random sample of 10 cards was drawn from the deck. They were then asked to estimate the probability that the conditional "if a card has an A, then it is red" (if p then q) is true for this sample of 10 cards. A random sample instead of the total population was chosen as the referent of the statement because the presence of a number of cards with a blue A logically entails that the statement cannot be true for the complete deck of cards. On the other hand, unlike Evans et al. (2003) , we used a sample larger than 1 to apply the conditional to, because people might have a tendency to understand conditionals as universals and therefore find it awkward to apply them to a single case. Likewise, some people might endorse a frequentist theory of probabilities and therefore find questions about the probability of a single event meaningless (Gigerenzer, 1996) .
The next question asked the following: "You have a chance to bet that this rule is true for the 10 cards. If the statement is true for all 10 cards, you win 100 DM [about $50 U.S.]. If it is false for the 10 cards, you lose your bet. How much would you maximally bet?" Answers were given in German marks. This question was introduced as an alternative way to measure subjective probabilities in case participants did not understand the term probability in the mathematical sense in the first question (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) . A final set of questions asked about the probability of the inverse conditional, "if a card has a red letter, then the letter is A" (if q then p), both directly and in the betting format (these two questions did not yield any interesting results and are not discussed further). The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Experiment 1B was identical to Experiment 1A except that we realized a between-subjects design. A single condition was available on Oliver Wilhelm's Web page at any time; after about 500 responses the condition was exchanged. The whole experiment lasted about 1 year.
Results
An alpha level of .05 was adopted as criterion of significance for all statistical tests. The manipulation check questions showed that the modal probability estimates for the four truth table cases matched the true proportions exactly in all conditions of both experiments (except that participants tended to round to the closest integer); the mean estimates were close to the true values. The majority of participants seems to have interpreted the frequency information as intended.
The subjective conditional probabilities P(q͉p) and P(¬q͉p) were submitted to 2 ϫ 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs; repeated measures for Experiment 1A and between subjects for Experiment 1B) with ratio and frequency of pq as factors. For the probability of q given p, there was a large main effect of ratio in both experiments, F(1, 60) ϭ 233.4, MSE ϭ 265.3, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 1199.6, MSE ϭ 337.7, for Experiments 1A and 1B, respectively.
1
The main effect of the frequency of pq also was significant, F(1, 60) ϭ 8.44, MSE ϭ 514.4, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 104.5, MSE ϭ 337.7. The interaction was not significant (F ϭ 0.7, and F ϭ 0.8). For the probability of ¬q given p, there was a main effect of ratio, F(1, 60) ϭ 978.4, MSE ϭ 77.3, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 1769.8, MSE ϭ 257.0; the effect of frequency was weak and significant in Experiment 1B only, F(1, 1998) ϭ 20.5, MSE ϭ 257.0, and there was no interaction. The mean conditional probability estimations in the four conditions are given in the first two rows of Table 3 . The probability estimations for the conditional statement "if p then q" were likewise submitted to ANOVAs with ratio and frequency of pq as factors. Again, both main effects were reliable in both experiments; for the effect of ratio, F(1, 60) ϭ 58.67, MSE ϭ 495.9, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 576.4, MSE ϭ 640.7, for Experiments 1A and 1B, respectively; for the effect of frequency of pq, F(1, 60) ϭ 21.7, MSE ϭ 538.3, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 33.5, MSE ϭ 640.7. The interaction was not significant (F ϭ .02, and F ϭ 3.7, respectively). The third row of Table 3 shows that participants estimated the probability of the conditional to be higher when the ratio of pq to p¬q was high and when the frequency of pq was high.
The means of the probability estimates give only an incomplete picture of the data. The modal responses, which accounted for about half of all answers, corresponded exactly to the conditional probability in each condition (i.e., 50 for low ratio and 90 for high ratio). In the conditions with low frequency of pq, there was a marked second peak in the distribution consisting of the answers "5" and "10." In these conditions, the percentage of cases of pq is (close to or exactly) 5%. In condition HH, in which the mode was 90, there was a second peak at 50, which is close to the actual percentage of pq cases in this condition (900 of 2,000). The 1 Throughout this section, where pairs of F statistics are reported, the first is from Experiment 1A and the second is from Experiment 1B.
2 It might be noted that in some cases the positive and negative conditional probabilities do not sum to 100 as they should according to probability theory. Informal interviews with some participants revealed that they occasionally misunderstood the question about conditional probabilities as questions about the conjunctive probability, which is, of course, smaller. The deviation from 100 was small overall, therefore this misunderstanding cannot have occurred very often. Note. Estimates were made on a scale from 0 to 100. Probabilities derived from bets can have values between 0 and 1. HH ϭ high frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); HL ϭ high frequency of pq, low P(q͉p); LH ϭ low frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); LL ϭ low frequency of pq, low P(q͉p); P(Cond.) ϭ "if p then q"; P(Cond.) from bets ϭ subjective probability of the conditional "if p then q" as computed from bets.
bimodal nature of these distributions is most pronounced with the large sample size of Experiment 1B (see Figure 1 ). Table 3 shows that the estimates for P(q͉p) and P(if p then q) were remarkably similar. Therefore, we conducted joint analyses of these two estimates with ANOVAs involving target of estimate (conditional probability vs. probability of the conditional) as a third factor besides ratio and frequency of pq. In both experiments, there was a main effect of the target factor, indicating that the probability of the conditional was estimated to be lower than the conditional probability, F(1, 60) ϭ 21.4, MSE ϭ 450.5, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 112.3, MSE ϭ 331.3. In Experiment 1A, ratio affected the conditional probability estimate more than the estimate for the conditional, F(1, 61) ϭ 13.2, MSE ϭ 232.7; this interaction was not significant in Experiment 1B. The frequency of pq did not interact with target in both experiments (all Fs Ͻ 2.6). Thus, consistent over the two experiments, frequency of pq affected the two estimates to the same degree.
Participants' bets on the truth of "if p then q" were transformed into subjective probabilities by the formula p ϭ bet/(bet ϩ 100). With these subjective probabilities as dependent variables, there was again a main effect of ratio, F(1, 60) ϭ 17.9, MSE ϭ 0.009, and F(1, 1998) ϭ 57.4, MSE ϭ 0.039. The effect of frequency was not significant in Experiment 1A (F ϭ 2.1), but it was in Experiment 1B, although with a weak effect size, F(1, 1998) ϭ 4.9, MSE ϭ 0.039. There was no interaction (both Fs ϭ 1.2). The subjective probabilities calculated from bets are summarized in the last row of Table 3 . They show the same pattern as the direct probability estimates, although on a lower absolute level, most likely because participants hardly ever bet more than 100 DM ($50 U.S.; which yields a subjective probability of .50). This might be explained by risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) .
Experiment 1B provided a large enough sample for us to investigate correlations of the three dependent variables (estimated conditional probabilities, estimated probabilities of the conditional, and subjective probabilities of the conditional derived from bets) within each condition. Table 4 shows that the correlations between the conditional probability estimates and the estimated probability of the conditional were significantly positive, although not very strong. The same holds for the correlations between directly estimated and derived subjective probabilities of the conditional. Thus, not only the experimentally induced variation in conditional probabilities P(q͉p) but also the natural variance within experimental groups was associated with the variance in subjective probabilities of the conditional. The estimates of the probability of a pq card did not correlate systematically with any of the three variables considered here.
Discussion
The data of both experiments are very consistent. They show a strong effect of the ratio of pq to p¬q cases, supporting the conditional probability view of conditionals, and a weaker but (in most analyses) reliable effect of the frequency of pq, supporting the mental models account without elaboration of the implicit models (MM1). The data clearly contradict the mental models account with elaboration (MM2), because the probability estimates of the conditional increased with the frequency of pq and by implication also increased with the frequency of p¬q in the present design. This also contradicts the idea that people represent conditionals as material implications: When the frequency of cases violating the material implication ( p¬q) increased, the probability that "if p then q" is true was estimated higher, not lower.
The distributions of probability estimates suggest that a majority of participants estimated the probability of "if p then q" simply as equal to the probability of q, given p, in perfect accordance with the conditional probability account. A minority chose estimates of 5% or 10%, in particular when the frequency of pq was low. These participants could be seen as estimating the relative frequency of the explicit mental model, pq. Five percent is the correct frequency of pq in the low-frequency conditions, whereas 10% is a value one obtains taking 1,000 instead of 2,000 as the sample size, a natural error in the present setting. In sum, the data suggest that a majority of logically untutored people represent conditional statements according to the probabilistic account, whereas a minority represent them as the mental model theory presumes.
One could argue that the proportion of participants representing conditionals in terms of mental models is much larger than estimated here (and might in fact encompass all of them), if a bit less than half of the participants reason with MM2 and the others without elaboration (MM1). Thus, one subset of the sample would generate a negative effect of the frequency of pq (because of the correlated frequency of p¬q), and the other subset would generate a positive effect. In the aggregate data, this would show as only a weak net effect of the frequency of pq, together with an effect of ratio (the latter one being generated only by those participants who use MM2). This account, however, could not explain the fact that the modes of the distributions so clearly match the conditional probabilities of q, given p, in all four conditions. 3 A remarkable and unexpected finding was that not only the probability estimates for the conditional statements but also the estimated conditional probabilities of q, given p, were affected by the frequency of pq. One explanation could be that some participants represented P(q͉p) as a paraphrase of P(if p then q), which in turn they represented in terms of mental models that make the conditional true. The positive correlations between these two estimates within groups suggest that it might be the same participants who used a mental-model representation as the basis for both probability estimates. The moderate size of these correlations and the fact that estimates for P(if p then q) tended to be lower than P(q͉p), however, show that only a subset of participants understood the two as equivalent. In Experiment 1B, 52% of participants gave the same value for P(q͉p) and P(if p then q); only 23% of participants in Experiment 1A gave the same values consistently over all four conditions. 4 Another explanation would be that for some reason the frequency of pq affected the subjective conditional probability of q, given p (for some participants) and that this is responsible for the effect of the frequency of pq on subjective probabilities of "if p then q." To test this latter hypothesis, we conducted an analysis of covariance for the probability estimates of the conditional as dependent variable, with ratio and frequency of pq as factors and the estimates of P(q͉p) as covariate. Both factors were still significant, F(1, 1997) ϭ 105.9, for ratio, and F(1, 1997) ϭ 5.8, for the frequency of pq (MSE ϭ 567.2). Thus, ratio and frequency of pq had independent effects on the estimated probability of "if p then q" beyond those on the estimated conditional probability, implying that these effects were not simply reflections of an effect on the subjective conditional probabilities of q, given p.
Experiment 2
One could object that the first two experiments, as well as those conducted by Evans et al. (2003) , biased participants toward a probabilistic interpretation of the conditional because all questions referred to probabilities. Therefore, we conducted an Internetbased experiment equivalent to Experiment 1B but with a single question: Is the conditional true or false? Strictly speaking, the conditional is false in all four conditions, because it is known that there are counterexamples (i.e., cases with p and ¬q). Probabilistic accounts, however, allow a certain proportion of exceptions (Oaksford et al., 2000) , and Evans, Ellis, and Newstead (1996) provided first evidence that people in fact tolerate a small amount of p¬q cases and still regard "if p then q" as true. Therefore, we expected that at least some participants in a large sample would respond "true" in our experiment.
If people have a continuous degree of belief in a conditional "if p then q" and are forced to choose between "true" or "false," they must judge whether their degree of belief is sufficiently high to accept the conditional as true. We assume that they set a threshold such that degrees of belief larger than the threshold are regarded as sufficiently high to warrant a "true" judgment, and degrees lower than the threshold result in a "false" judgment. We hypothesized that if the degree of belief corresponds to the conditional probability of q, given p, more participants will have degrees of belief above threshold in the condition with high ratio of pq to p¬q than in the condition with low ratio. Likewise, if the frequency of pq affects people's degree of belief in the conditional, this factor should also affect the number of participants accepting the conditional as true. The threshold can be assumed to vary between individuals. We expected that on average it would be high, because a conditional expresses the belief that P(q͉p) is high or very high. To find a significant number of participants accepting conditionals as true in the face of exceptional cases, we anticipated needing a large sample of participants. Therefore, Experiment 2 was run as an Internet-based survey.
Method
Participants. After a screening of participants by the same criteria as applied to Experiment 1B, there remained 2,197 participants. The number of remaining participants for each group was as follows: HH, 533; HL, 600; LH, 538; and LL, 527. Their mean ages in the four conditions ranged from 25.6 to 27.2 years (SD ϭ 8.9 -9.9); 955 were men and 1,187 were women (55 did not respond to this question).
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were identical to those in Experiment 1B, except that there was only a single question: "Someone claims that the following general rule about the playing cards holds: 'If there is an A on a card, then it is red.' Do you think this is true or false?" Participants could tick either "true" or "false" on the menu; in case they felt uncertain they should choose "the answer they agreed with more."
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed with a log-linear model using ratio and frequency of pq as the independent variables and the frequency of "true" responses as the dependent variable.
5 A model with main effects of both independent variables on the frequency of "true" responses, but no interaction of the independent variables, fits the data well, 2 (1, N ϭ 2,198) ϭ 1.81, p ϭ .18. Further restricting the model by eliminating the effect of ratio on the frequency of "true" responses led to a significant deviation from the data, 2 (2, N 3 To see this, one should consider that MM1 predicts the probability of the conditional to be high in Conditions HH and HL and low in the other conditions, whereas MM2 predicts it to be high in Condition LH (only 10 cases of p¬q), medium in Conditions HH and LL (about 100 cases of p¬q), and low in Condition HL (900 cases of p¬q). The mixture model thus predicts two modes of about equal size in each condition: high plus medium for HH, high plus low for HL, low plus high for LH, and low plus medium for LL. This is not the observed pattern; the deviation is most obvious for condition HL, where the large mode in the data is medium (50). 4 When we split the sample of Experiment 1B into two groups according to whether the two estimates matched, the effects of ratio and frequency of pq on the estimate of P(q͉p) and of P(if p then q) were significant in both subgroups.
5 Log-linear models can be used like ANOVAs for frequency data. They are based on a chi-square test for the association of n variables, one of which is regarded as the dependent variable and the others as the independent variable. The analysis usually starts with a saturated model allowing all main effects and interactions. This model is then restricted (by disallowing interactions or main effects) until the most parsimonious model is found that does not deviate significantly from the data. ϭ 2,198) ϭ 43.0. Thus, there was a significant effect of ratio. Eliminating the effect of frequency of pq from the original model, on the other hand, hardly changed the fit at all, 2 (2, N ϭ 2,198) ϭ 1.90, p ϭ .39. Thus, there was no significant effect of the frequency of pq. The percentages of participants regarding the conditional statement as true in the four conditions were as follows: HH, 21%; HL, 10%; LH, 20%; and LL, 12%.
Although the task did not mention probabilities, the results are in good agreement with the probabilistic account of conditionals. The proportion of participants accepting a conditional statement as true doubled when the ratio of pq to p¬q was increased from 1:1 to 9:1. The frequency of pq (and by implication the frequency of p¬q) did not affect the truth ratings, in contrast to the results obtained with probability estimates. These data, therefore, provide no evidence in favor of a mental models account.
The mental model theory we derived our predictions from (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999) was tailored to probability judgments, not judgments of truth. When asked whether a statement is true or false, people might not look at the frequencies associated with the true models of the statement. Instead, they might just judge whether the state of affairs matches the models of the statement. In the scenarios of our experiments, there were always cases that match the explicit model of the conditional ( pq), cases that mismatch it ( p¬q), and cases that might or might not match the implicit model (¬pq and ¬p¬q) and hence might be regarded as irrelevant (as in the experiment of Johnson-Laird and Tagart, 1969) . This should have induced participants to always reject the conditional, because a single mismatching case makes the conditional false. Alternatively, they could have tolerated a few exceptions-then their judgments should have covaried with the frequency of the exceptions ( p¬q), which should have yielded a negative effect of the frequency of pq. None of this was observed, however. We conclude that there is no straightforward application of mental model theory that could accommodate the present data.
Experiment 3
The primary goal of this work was to test competing hypotheses about the core meaning of conditionals, independent of content and context. Therefore, we used artificial materials and arbitrary statements in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, we turned to thematic materials to investigate the generality of our findings. In addition, we began to explore how one aspect of content and context, the risk associated with falsely accepting versus falsely rejecting a conditional statement, modulates the core meaning of the conditional.
Consider a conditional such as "If the house has a tiled roof, then it houses a dog that bites." Accepting this conditional would induce one to be careful near houses with tiled roofs, to avoid getting bitten. The cost potentially arising from a Type 1 error (erroneously accepting the conditional) would be being unnecessarily careful. Rejecting the conditional, in contrast, would motivate one, for example, to approach dogs in houses with tiled roofs openly. The cost one risks by making a Type 2 error (erroneously rejecting the conditional) is to get bitten. The costs of a Type 2 error seem to loom larger than do the costs of a Type 1 error. Consider, in contrast, the following conditional: "If the mushroom has a triangle-shaped head, then it is edible." In this case, the cost associated with a Type 1 error (eating a poisonous mushroom) would be much higher than the cost associated with a Type 2 error (leaving an edible mushroom).
The relative risk associated with Type 1 and Type 2 errors has been discussed in the context of strategies for hypothesis testing (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Klayman & Ha, 1987) . Hypotheses can often be expressed as conditional statements, and the evidence gained during testing them usually comes in the form of one or several observations that correspond to the four cases of a truth table. Therefore, the probabilistic truth table evaluation task can be seen as focusing on one step in a hypothesis-testing procedure, that is, the evaluation of the hypothesis in light of given evidence. Previous studies testing the effect of risks and utilities on hypothesis testing have focused on people's search for evidence (e.g., the four-card selection task or the 2-4 -6 task; cf. Klayman & Ha, 1987) . Here we investigate how the relative costs of false rejections (Type 2 errors) and false acceptances (Type 1 errors) affect judgments of probability and truth of a conditional statement.
When the consequent of a conditional expresses an undesirable outcome, wrongly rejecting it (a Type 2 error) is associated with high costs, because one would not attempt to avoid the antecedent, and hence would experience the undesirable outcome (e.g., eating spoiled food). Wrongly accepting such a conditional (a Type 1 error), in contrast, would unnecessarily motivate one to avoid the antecedent, a behavior that could lead to missing of an opportunity but usually does not involve high costs (e.g., not eating good food). For a conditional in which the consequent expresses a desirable outcome, wrongly accepting the conditional (a Type 1 error) would motivate one to actively generate or search for the antecedent, potentially leading to harm when the desired outcome does not occur (e.g., the mushroom expected to be edible is not). A Type 2 error (wrongly rejecting the conditional), in contrast, would just imply missing an opportunity to obtain the desirable outcome (e.g., missing an edible mushroom). As long as missing an opportunity is less costly than experiencing an undesirable event, one can therefore expect that people would be more willing to endorse a conditional when its consequent expresses an undesirable outcome than when it expresses a desirable outcome.
From a logical point of view, the relative costs associated with the two types of errors in evaluating a statement should not influence the truth value or the probability assigned to the statement. However, from a broader perspective on rationality that includes utilities (Evans & Over, 1996) , one could argue that the reasonable degree of belief in a statement depends in part on the relative costs of the two possible errors. Evans and Over (1996) defined rationality 1 as aiming at maximizing personal utility. According to this criterion, it is reasonable to accept a statement to the degree that the balance of the evidence favors it, because ceteris paribus it is useful to believe true statements and disbelieve false ones. According to the same criterion it is reasonable to tune one's degree of belief in a statement up or down depending on the costs associated with the two error types (as long as the evidence is not conclusive). This suggests that a cognitive system working according to rationality 1 uses only a single dimension of "reasonable degree of belief " depending on both factual evidence and relative costs of errors, instead of distinguishing between utilityfree probability of a statement and the consequences of errors on personal utility. If this is the case, one should expect higher probability estimates for conditional statements with an undesirable consequent than for those with a desirable consequent.
A further goal of these experiments was to investigate whether the quantifier all, which is seen as related to the conditional in propositional calculus, behaves similarly in our experimental paradigm. Propositional logic defines "all A are B" as "if something is an A, then it is a B." If this equivalence is psychologically real, then the pattern of results should be the same for the evaluation of a statement like "all mushrooms with triangle-shaped heads are edible" as for "if a mushroom has a triangle-shaped head, it is edible." One group of participants was confronted with statements of the form "if p then q"; the other group received the corresponding statements with all.
Because the previous experiments showed no evidence that people understand conditional sentences the way propositional logic prescribes (i.e., as material implication), we did not expect psychological equivalence of if-then and all. Intuitively, it seemed more plausible to us to assume that conditionals are not truth functional (i.e., have no truth conditions in terms of their component propositions) than to assume that quantified statements are not truth functional. Statements of the form "all A are B" seem to be about what is the case in the world, whereas statements of the form "if p then q" are more readily applied to counterfactual situations, expressing an inferential link between p and q regardless of whether p or q are true or false. Therefore, one could assume that conditional statements are understood (by most people) in terms of conditional probabilities, whereas quantified statements might be more naturally interpreted in terms of mental models of their truth conditions. We hypothesized that if this was the case, we would see a larger effect of the frequency of pq (and maybe a smaller effect of ratio) with quantified sentences than with conditionals.
A third goal of Experiment 3 relates to individual differences in interpretations of the conditional (and equivalent quantified sentences). The joint effect of ratio and frequency of pq on participants' estimated probabilities of conditionals, as observed in the previous experiments and by Evans et al. (2003) , could be due to the averaging over participants using different interpretations of the sentences. Indeed, Evans et al. (2003) were able to divide their participants into two groups, such that in one group only the ratio predicted the estimates and in the other group only the frequency of pq did. This suggests that some participants interpret the conditional as the conditional probability, thus being affected only by ratio in their judgment, whereas the others interpret it in terms of the mental model theory (without elaboration), thus being affected exclusively by the frequency of pq cases. Experiment 3 provided an opportunity for a further test of this hypothesis, because each participant provided probability estimates for each of the cells in the basic design (see Table 2 ), so that the interpretation of the conditional can be estimated on an individual basis. We therefore tested a relatively large number of participants (compared with the other lab experiments) to provide sufficient data for a distribution analysis of individual interpretations.
Method
Participants. Participants were high school students from Potsdam and University undergraduates from University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany. There were 77 participants in the conditional group and 87 participants in the quantifier group. Materials and procedure. Four context stories were constructed (see the Appendix). Each involved a conditional statement that was plausible in the context of the story but arbitrary in light of general world knowledge (e.g., "If the house has a red roof, then it houses a dog that bites"), so that a belief bias in favor or against the conditional should not play a systematic role in the experiments. Two of the conditionals had desirable outcomes as consequents, and two of them had undesirable outcomes as consequents (see Table 5 ). For the quantifier group, the conditional statements were replaced by semantically equivalent statements with all. Each story ended with a paragraph stating that a random sample of 50 exemplars was drawn from the original population of 2,000, and the questions that followed were said to refer to this sample. The first set of four questions asked for probability estimates for the four cases of the truth table. The final question asked for an estimation of the probability that the conditional (or the quantified statement) is true for the sample. Probability estimates were again given on a scale from 0 to 100. Two booklets were compiled by combining the four frequency conditions of Table 1 with the four context stories (see Table 5 , Booklets A and B), thereby pairing each frequency condition once with a desirable consequent and once with an undesirable consequent. Half the participants in each group received Booklet A, and the other half received Booklet B. The order of the four tasks in both booklets was "mushrooms," "dogs," "beans," and "CDs." Participants completed the booklets in the context of one of three larger, unrelated experiments. 6 Because we are interested in the comparison of if-then and all, we treat the two groups as two conditions of one experiment, following the suggestion of a reviewer. The groups were tested one after the other, however, and participants were not assigned at random to them, because we decided to compare the conditional with the quantified statement only after running the experiment with conditionals. Note. In Experiment 3, corresponding sentences with all were used. HH ϭ high frequency of pq, high ratio; HL ϭ high frequency of pq, low ratio; LH ϭ low frequency of pq, high ratio; LL ϭ low frequency of pq, low ratio. Positive signs indicate a positive consequent, and negative signs indicate a negative consequent. Biting dogs ϭ "If a house has a red roof, it houses a dog that bites"; Edible mushrooms ϭ "If a mushroom has a triangle-shaped head, it is edible"; CDs with bugs ϭ "If a CD contains the game PingPong, it has a bug"; Edible beans ϭ "If a can contains red beans, they are edible".
Results
The probability estimates for the conditional or quantified statements were submitted to a mixed-model ANOVA with frequency of pq and ratio as within-subject factors, and group (conditional vs. quantifier) and booklet (A vs. B) as between-subjects factors. As in the previous experiments, there were main effects of both ratio, F(1, 160) ϭ 110.8, MSE ϭ 573.7, and frequency of pq, F(1, 160) ϭ 23.0, MSE ϭ 711.2. Both effects did not interact with group (F Ͻ 1), therefore there is no evidence that all differs from if-then.
The effect of the desirability of the consequent was tested by the interaction of ratio with booklet. As can be seen in the first two rows of Table 5 , Booklet A paired high ratio with undesirable consequent and low ratio with desirable consequent, whereas this was reversed in Booklet B. A main effect of desirability of the consequent should therefore appear as a Ratio ϫ Booklet interaction in the present design. This interaction was significant, F(1, 160) ϭ 9.60, MSE ϭ 573.7. The probability of the critical statement (conditional or quantified sentence) was estimated as higher when the consequent was undesirable (high ratio in Booklet A and low ratio in Booklet B) than when the consequent was desirable (low ratio in Booklet A and high ratio in Booklet B).
A closer inspection of the data, however, makes clear that the effect is restricted to the conditionals. Mean probability estimates for conditionals were 54 when the consequent was undesirable but only 45 when the consequent was desirable. The corresponding probability estimates for quantified sentences were 48 for undesirable consequents and 46 for desirable consequents. This observation was confirmed by a significant Ratio ϫ Booklet ϫ Group interaction, F(1, 160) ϭ 4.08, MSE ϭ 375.1. When the desirability effect was tested separately in the two groups, the critical Ratio ϫ Booklet interaction was significant in the conditional group, F(1, 75) ϭ 12.62, MSE ϭ 561.0, but negligible in the quantifier group (F Ͻ 1). The mean probability estimates of all design cells are summarized in Table 6 .
Because conditionals and quantified statements did not differ with respect to the effects of ratio and frequency, we combined the data from both groups for an analysis of individual interpretations. To capture a participant's interpretation of the conditional or the corresponding quantified sentence, we computed two indices, one reflecting the effect of ratio and another index reflecting the effect of the frequency of pq on the participant's estimated probability of the conditional. The ratio index was built from the probability estimates by the following equation: (HH ϩ LH) Ϫ (HL ϩ LL). The frequency index was defined as follows: (HH ϩ HL) Ϫ (LH ϩ LL). The two indices represent the two orthogonal main effects in the basic design. Participants choosing to interpret the conditional as a conditional probability should have high ratio indices combined with frequency indices around zero. Participants interpreting the conditional according to MM1 should have high frequency indices combined with ratio indices around zero. The other two possible cases (i.e., high values on both indices or low values on both indices) should occur relatively rarely. In fact, the two indices were negatively correlated (r ϭ Ϫ.37). Figure 2 shows the distributions of the two indices.
Both indices seem to have a bimodal distribution, with one mode around zero and the other above zero. To test this impression statistically, we fit a mixture model of two normal functions to the distributions. This bimodal model had four free parameters: the two means, their standard deviation (which was fixed to be equal), and N 1 (the number of cases contributing to the first function; the number of cases for the second function equals 164 Ϫ N 1 ). The model was fitted to the distribution of each index by minimizing 2 ϭ (N obs Ϫ N pred, N ϭ 164) 2 /N pred . This model was compared with a unimodal model by restricting the two means to be equal. For the ratio index, the bimodal model fitted the data with 2 (9, N ϭ 164) ϭ 34.6, and the unimodal model fitted the data with 2 (10, N ϭ 164) ϭ 69.9, which is significantly worse. The estimated parameters of the bimodal model were 1 ϭ Ϫ5, and 2 ϭ 76 ( ϭ 24), N 1 ϭ 72. For the frequency index, 2 (9, N ϭ 164) ϭ 60.0, for the bimodal model, and 2 (10, N ϭ 164) ϭ 66.1, for the unimodal model, which again is a significant difference ( p ϭ .013). Parameter estimates were 1 ϭ -9, and 2 ϭ 80 ( ϭ 38), N 1 ϭ 120.
Thus, for both indices, the bimodal model did not provide a good fit, mostly because the observed peaks were steeper than predicted by the normal distributions. Nonetheless, the chi-square difference between the bimodal and the unimodal model was significant for both indices, confirming the bimodality of the distributions. This is consistent with a classification of participants into two groups along the dimension of each index: one group that takes the variable in question (ratio or frequency of pq, respectively) into consideration for estimating the probability of the conditional, generating a mean index around 80, and one that is not influenced by this variable, generating a mean index around 0. A ratio index of 80 arises when the probability estimates perfectly Note. HH ϭ high frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); HL ϭ high frequency of pq, low P(q͉p); LH ϭ low frequency of pq, high P(q͉p); LL ϭ low frequency of pq, low P(q͉p).
match the ratio of pq to p¬q ϫ 100; it then equals (90 ϩ 90) Ϫ (50 ϩ 50). A frequency index of about 80 arises when a participant's estimates perfectly match the percentage of pq cases: (45 ϩ 45) Ϫ (4.5 ϩ 5). With the negative correlation of the two indices, this implies that most participants can be classified into two categories: those that take into consideration the ratio of pq to p¬q while ignoring the frequency of pq, and those who make their estimates depend on the frequency of pq but ignore the ratio. Table  7 shows such a classification with the cutoff criterion for both indices set arbitrarily at 40.
Discussion
Four important conclusions can be drawn from the results of this experiment. First, the effect of both ratio and frequency of pq observed before was generalized to thematic materials. Second, the same effects were observed for statements with the quantifier all. Thus, to the extent that our results question the idea that people understand conditional statements in terms of truth tables, they also question the idea that universally quantified statements are interpreted in terms of truth tables.
Third, the distribution analyses provide strong additional support for the hypothesis that participants can be classified into a group conforming to the probabilistic interpretation of the conditional, and another, smaller group conforming to a truth-functional interpretation, as incorporated in MM1. It seems that there are two disjointed psychological meanings for both if-then and all, with few people using a compromise interpretation. Evans et al. (2003) observed an equivalent division of participants into two groups. Whereas the groups were of about equal size in their study, we found a clear majority for the conditional probability interpretation.
The fourth conclusion is that the relative costs of the two possible errors in hypothesis testing affect the subjective probabilities assigned to the conditional. When the cost of falsely accepting a conditional is higher, the subjective probability is biased downward; when the cost of falsely rejecting a conditional is higher, the subjective probability is biased upward. At least with the context stories used in Experiment 3, which clearly stated the practical relevance of the conditional statements for a protagonist, people seem to understand "probability" broadly, encompassing not only the probability that the statement is factually true but also the degree to which believing it serves personal utility.
The effect of personal utility, however, was confined to the conditional statements; it did not generalize to statements with all. This suggests a dissociation between the evaluation of the believability of a statement in light of the given factual evidence on the one hand and the evaluation of its utility as a guideline for action on the other hand. The degree of belief in conditionals integrates the outcomes of both processes, whereas the degree of belief in universally quantified statements depends only on the evaluation of the given probabilities. This dissociation was not expected, and we are not aware of any theory that can account for it. It would be desirable to attempt a replication before speculating about its source.
One limitation of Experiment 3 is that it did not completely cross the four frequency conditions with the four stories and their order of presentation. As a consequence, the factor frequency of pq was confounded with order of presentation. We do not believe that people's interpretation of the conditional changes substantially over four analogous problems, because the results from a withinsubject experiment (Experiment 1A) and an identical betweensubjects experiment (Experiment 1B) were strikingly similar. Moreover, it is hard to see how any order effect could have contributed to the bimodal distribution of the frequency index, which underlies the overall effect of frequency of pq in this experiment. The confound was removed in Experiment 4.
Experiment 4
The last experiment in this series combined the thematic materials of Experiment 3 with the simple question of whether a conditional statement is true as used in Experiment 2. Only conditionals were investigated.
Method
Participants. Participants were 56 students from the University of Potsdam. They completed the booklet at the end of an unrelated experiment.
Materials and procedure. We constructed four booklets by combining the four context stories outlined in the appendix with the four frequency conditions in the way shown in Table 5 . The order of the four tasks in all booklets was "mushrooms," "dogs," "beans," and "CDs." By using four booklets instead of two, we could completely cross the assignment of context stories to frequency conditions. Participants read the stories, one on each page of the booklet, and then judged the conditional as "true" or "false." 
Results and Discussion
Most participants declared the conditional as false in most conditions, as they should from a logical point of view given that there were always cases of p¬q. The percentage of participants who accepted the conditionals are tabulated by condition and booklet in Table 8 . We combined Booklets A and C into one group of participants because both booklets combined a high ratio of pq to p¬q with a low desirability of the consequent. Likewise, we grouped participants with Booklets B and D because these booklets combined high-ratio rules with high desirability.
For statistical evaluation we computed ratio and frequency indices for each participant as described above (see Experiment 3). The ratio index was larger for the low-desirability group (.39) than for the high-desirability group (.19), F(1, 54) ϭ 3.37, MSE ϭ 0.16, p ϭ .036, one-tailed. Post hoc comparisons with Wilcoxon tests showed that the acceptance of the conditional increased with ratio in the group in which high ratio was coupled with an undesirable outcome (Booklets A and C; Z ϭ Ϫ3.39, p ϭ .001). In the group in which high-ratio conditionals had desirable outcomes as consequents (Booklets B and D), the effect of ratio was also significant, although with a smaller effect size (Z ϭ Ϫ2.33, p ϭ .02). The frequency variable had no effect in either group of participants.
The findings of this experiment confirm that people rely mainly on the conditional probability P(q͉p) to judge not only the probability of a conditional but also its binary truth value. In addition, they show that the utility of accepting a conditional also affects truth judgments in the same way as it affects probability estimates for a conditional. In contrast with our findings in Experiment 3, we found no evidence for an effect of frequency of pq. Thus, with regard to the frequency variable, we found the same pattern with thematic as with abstract conditionals: The effect of frequency was evident with a probability question but not with a question about truth or falsity.
General Discussion
We started this series of experiments to test three accounts of the psychological meaning of conditionals: (a) The mental model account without elaboration (MM1); (b) the mental model account with elaborated models (MM2), which is equivalent to the material implication; and (c) the interpretation of conditionals as expressing a high conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. Consistently over all experiments we found strong support for the conditional probability hypothesis. In some but not all experiments we obtained additional evidence, although with a weaker effect size, for the hypothesis that people interpret conditionals as not-elaborated mental models (MM1). No evidence was obtained that a substantial number of logically untutored people endorsed a material implication interpretation of the conditional, as would be expected on the basis of elaborated mental models or on some other way of representing the definition of if in propositional calculus. An analysis of individual differences (see Experiment 3) suggested that most people rely exclusively on one interpretation, which is based either on the conditional probability or the frequency of pq cases. These results are in full agreement with the findings that Evans et al. (2003) obtained independently with a similar experimental design, thus providing strong converging evidence for (a) the conjecture that the probabilistic interpretation is the modal psychological meaning of if among logically untrained adults in at least two European countries and (b) the existence of a (probably smaller) group of people endorsing an alternative interpretation based only on the frequency of pq cases.
In addition, Experiments 2 and 4 showed for the first time that people interpret conditional statements as conditional probabilities even when they are asked about the truth or falsity of a conditional statement rather than about its probability. This is important because asking for the probability of a conditional might bias people toward adopting a probabilistic interpretation for several reasons. First, some superficial readers might simply mistake the question as one about the probability of the consequent under the condition that the antecedent holds. Second, even when they understand the question correctly, people might be inclined to endorse the conditional probability interpretation only when they are asked for a probability of a conditional. An interpretation of the conditional as material implication, for example, would imply rules for judging whether a given situation makes a conditional true or false, but it does not provide straightforward means to calculate a reasonable degree of belief in a conditional. Finally, people with a logical mind using binary truth values might resort to an interpretation of conditionals in terms of conditional probabilities only as a fallback option when they have to rate the probability of a conditional. This kind of objection can be ruled out on the basis of the results from Experiments 2 and 4. The conditional probability was the main determinant of people's acceptance of a conditional statement, regardless of whether we asked for the probability of the statement or about its truth value.
The kind of question did make a difference, however, for the effect of the frequency of pq. The degree of belief in a conditional increased with the frequency of pq cases only in those experiments in which participants were asked for a probability estimate. One possible explanation for this discrepancy between experiments could be that the scenarios leading to a probability question always involved drawing a sample from the original population to which the conditional should apply. In the scenarios asking about truth or falsity of the conditional, in contrast, the conditional always referred to the whole population. This could make a difference if some participants believe that the existence of at least one pq case is a necessary prerequisite for "if p then q" to be true. When a random sample is drawn, the probability of drawing at least one pq case increases with the relative frequency of pq in the population. This could explain the increase of acceptance of conditionals with higher frequencies of pq in the experiments that asked for probabilities (i.e., Experiments 1 and 3). No such effect would be expected in the experiments asking about truth, because the existence of pq cases in the population was guaranteed by the infor- mation given. Future experiments will have to clarify whether the effect of the frequency of pq reflects an interpretation of the conditional in terms of mental models (MM1) or just the requirement that there be at least one pq case, in addition to P(q͉p) being high, for the conditional to be true. The finding that participants sensitive to the frequency of pq tend to be those who are not sensitive to the ratio variable (Experiment 3, and Experiment 3 of Evans et al., 2003) suggests that they are really endorsing a different interpretation of the conditional, not just an additional requirement. Experiments 2 and 4 also provide a replication of a finding reported by : People are ready to accept a conditional statement as true even if there are a few cases of p¬q. The inclination to do so was a function of P(q͉p) but not of the frequency of pq. This implies that the acceptance of "if p then q" as true did not vary as a function of the absolute frequency of p¬q either, because in the present design pq and p¬q are coupled within each category of the ratio variable.
Another new finding is the effect of utility on probability estimations and truth ratings for conditionals. In scenarios in which the conditional was proposed as a rule to guide action, conditionals were given higher degrees of belief when their acceptance would leave the protagonist on the safe side, compared with when acceptance of the conditional would involve a personal risk for the protagonist. Thus, the degree of belief as reflected in the probability or truth judgments reflects a combination of epistemic information (i.e., the frequency distribution of the truth table cases) and pragmatic utility information (i.e., the personal consequences of falsely accepting or falsely rejecting a rule). Surprisingly, the utility information had no effect when the same rules were expressed as statements with a universal quantifier (i.e. "all p cases are q cases").
The integration of epistemic and utility information was predicted by the concept of rationality 1 as defined by Evans and Over (1996) : Reasoning on the basis of rationality 1 serves the achievement of personal goals in an uncertain world, and this warrants a compromise between maximizing the likelihood of one's beliefs being true and minimizing harm in case they turn out to be false nonetheless. Thus, from the perspective of rationality 1 the degree of belief in a statement should depend both on epistemic information (i.e., factual evidence) and utility information (i.e., what happens when the belief turns out to be false). Rationality 2, in contrast, is reasoning according to established rules of rationality. One important, although often implicit, rule about epistemic reasoning is that truth or falsity of a statement has nothing to do with whether believing the statement is of any personal value for the subject. Thus, rationality 2 would prescribe that probability estimations and truth judgments be unaffected by utility, as it was found for statements with all. Why people seem to apply rationality 1 to conditionals but rationality 2 to semantically equivalent quantified statements, however, is mysterious. If this finding turns out to be reliable, it would provide a constraint for theories of pragmatic rationality (i.e., rationality 1 in Evans and Over's, 1996, terminology) . We suggest that if-then and all statements share a procedure to evaluate their truth on the basis of given information about the frequencies of events. The influence of personal utility on the degree of belief seems to occur in a later, independent processing step, which is applied only to conditionals.
The findings from the present experiments, as well as those reported by Evans et al. (2003) , pose a serious problem for a truth-functional account of the psychological meaning of conditionals. The most prominent such account is the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird et al., 1992) . In its present form, the mental model theory of the conditional cannot account for the observation that most people's degree of belief in "if p then q" is determined by their subjective conditional probability P(q͉p). If people construct all three mental models to represent the conditional, they should interpret the conditional as a material implication. Few participants did this in our experiments or in those of Evans et al. (2003) . If people construct only one explicit mental model, they should make their degree of belief in the conditional a function of the frequency of pq. This was apparently done by a substantial number of participants, but they were still a minority.
As a consequence, Evans et al. (2003) argued for abandoning the mental model account of the conditional. Instead, they proposed that conditionals are interpreted by a cognitive process first suggested by Ramsey (1931) , called the Ramsey test, which they elaborated further. In a first step, interpreting a conditional "if p then q" focuses attention on the cases in which the antecedent p is true. In the next step, people estimate the frequencies or probabilities of pq and p¬q cases within the focused set of cases. Comparing these two quantities yields an estimate of the conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, which determines the degree of belief in the conditional. According to Evans et al. (2003) , the subset of people judging the conditional as a function of the frequency of pq alone can also be explained by their Ramsey test, assuming that the process stops after evaluating the probability of pq cases but before estimating the frequency of p¬q cases (e.g., because of a lack of working memory capacity). Therefore, they base their judgment on the former probability alone. Evans et al. (2003) argued that execution of the full Ramsey test is incompatible with the principle of truth incorporated in the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 2001; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2000) : Models represent explicitly only true possibilities (i.e., what is or can be the case when the represented statement is true). The Ramsey test, however, involves representing the p¬q cases that are false possibilities.
Unlike Evans et al. (2003) , we believe that the theory of mental models can be modified such that it can integrate the Ramsey test. Here we can give only a preliminary sketch of the direction in which the model theory could be developed to accommodate the present results. We agree that conditionals induce focusing on those mental models in which the antecedent is true. There is no need, however, to explicitly represent the false possibility p¬q. Instead, one can derive an estimate of the conditional probability by estimating the frequency of pq models and relate it to an estimated frequency of p models that disregard the variable Q (with its values q and ¬q) altogether. Incomplete models leaving out the value of one of the variables are already part of the model theory-for instance, the initial representation of a disjunction "p or q" consists of a model of p cases, leaving open the Q variable, and an alternative model of q, leaving the P variable indeterminate (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) .
This mental model version of the Ramsey test also provides a more natural explanation of those judgments that estimate the probability of the conditional as a function of the frequency of pq alone. Evans et al. (2003) cannot make plausible why people should be willing or able to represent the pq cases but not the p¬q cases. The representations of the two cases play symmetrical roles in their account, therefore one should expect that an equal number of people lacking cognitive rigor or capacity would fail estimating either of them. This should yield a substantial number of participants giving judgments as a function of the p¬q frequency alone, which was not found (the correlation of judgments with the frequency of p¬q was low when confounds were minimized in Evans et al.'s, 2003, Experiment 3) . Our version of the Ramsey test, motivated by preserving the principle of truth as a core assumption of mental model theory, naturally accounts for this asymmetry: People who base their judgments on the frequency of pq cases alone are those that set the frequency of pq in relation to the whole sample instead of the frequency of p cases. Their omission is not the second part of the Ramsey test procedure, but the very first step-they fail to focus on the p cases only.
To conclude, our experiments provide support for a probabilistic theory of the psychological meaning of conditionals, and for a theory incorporating personal utility as a determinant of subjective degrees of belief in conditional statements. They pose a challenge to the theory of mental models in its present form. We are optimistic, however, that a mental model theory revised along the lines suggested above will be able to incorporate the interpretation of conditionals as conditional probabilities.
Four Context Stories Used in Experiments 3 and 4
The mushroom story in condition HL is documented completely below; the other context stories follow in abbreviated form.
Edible Mushrooms
In a remote forest of Australia several new kinds of mushrooms were discovered. Some of the mushrooms had triangle-shaped heads, others had square heads. Some of the mushrooms are edible, others are poisonous. Scientists have meanwhile investigated 2,000 mushrooms. Their studies have yielded the following results: 900 mushrooms had triangle-shaped heads and were edible. 900 mushrooms had triangle-shaped heads and were poisonous. 100 mushrooms had square heads and were edible. 100 mushrooms had square heads and were poisonous.
The different kinds of mushrooms were distributed randomly over the whole forest.
A tourist has collected mushrooms in this forest. He has picked up all mushrooms he found. At the end of the day he has 50 mushrooms in his basket.
Question 1: Imagine he picks one mushroom at random from his basket. Please estimate how probable it is that the following is the case (please give values between 0 ϭ completely impossible and 100 ϭ absolutely certain):
a) The mushroom has a triangle-shaped head and is edible.
b) The mushroom has a square head and is edible.
c) The mushroom has a triangle-shaped head and is poisonous.
d) The mushroom has a square head and is poisonous.
Question 2: The tourist would like to eat the edible mushrooms. He thinks he can rely on the following rule for choosing mushrooms:
[for conditional group:] If a mushroom has a triangle-shaped head, then it is edible. [for quantifier group:] All mushrooms with a triangleshaped head are edible.
Estimate how probable it is that this rule is true for the 50 mushrooms in the basket. Give a number between 0 ϭ completely impossible and 100 ϭ absolutely certain. The probability that the rule holds for the 50 mushrooms is: .
Biting Dogs
In a village in Siberia there are houses with red roofs (tiled roofs) and houses with black roofs (slate roofs). Some house owners have big, biting dogs. Others have small, peaceful dogs. The village has 2,000 inhabitants. The community statistics contains the following: [Frequency information about 2,000 houses].
The four types of houses are scattered randomly over the village. A postman has the order delivering mail to 50 houses selected at random from the village. . . . The postman doesn't want to be bitten. So he plans to throw the mail over the fence when there is a biting dog in a house. He thinks he can rely on the following rule: If a house has a red roof, then it houses a dog that bites. . . .
Edible Beans
An aid organization in a refugee camp receives donations from the company "Good Bean" on a regular basis. There are two kinds of cans: red beans and white beans. Unfortunately, it has shown in the past that some cans were spoiled. Until today, 2,000 cans have been delivered. An employee of the organization has the following notes about them. [Frequency information about 2,000 cans].
The four categories of cans are distributed randomly over the 2,000 cans. Now a new set of 50 cans arrived. . . . The organization wants to avoid delivering spoiled beans to the refugees. It thinks it can rely on the following rule: If a can has red beans, then the beans are edible. . . .
CDs With Bugs
In the quality control department of a big software company many defective products have been discovered during the last weeks. Since then 2,000 CD-ROMs have been tested. Some of them contained the computer game "PingPong," the others the game "Highway." Some CDs had a bug, others were bug-free. The statistics show: [Frequency information about 2,000 CDs]. The four categories are distributed randomly over the 2,000 CDs of the last weeks. Quality control now receives a new set of 50 CDs. . . . Quality control wants to avoid delivering CDs with bugs. For a preliminary selection they plan to rely on the following rule: If a CD has the program PingPong on it, then it has a bug. . . .
